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Abstract 
When articles 2 and 3 of the Irish constitution were amended under the terms of the 1998 
Good Friday agreement to replace an apparent claim to jurisdiction over Northern Ireland by 
an aspirational statement regarding Irish unity, it seemed that many of the issues of conflict 
in the North-South relationship had been resolved. This article traces the process by which 
ideological change and policy reformation in southern Ireland during the course of the 
twentieth century facilitated this agreement and the associated constitutional reformulation, 
looking at three areas within which change is obvious. First, demands for Irish unity, 
vigorously expressed but confined substantially to the domain of rhetoric, were revisited in 
the early 1970s when the fuller implications of Irish unity became clearer, and in the context 
of a possible British withdrawal from Northern Ireland. Second, distaste for North-South 
institutions such as a Council of Ireland, on the ground that it implied recognition of partition, 
was replaced by a willingness to accept a modest level of institutionalised cross-border 
cooperation. Third, reluctance to recognise the legitimacy of Northern Ireland was reversed, 
with Irish governments moving progressively towards recognition of the principle of “consent” 
in the late twentieth century. Together, these changes amounted to a reversal of traditional 
irredentist policies and a formal acceptance of partition. 
Keywords: Northern Ireland, British-Irish relations, peace agreements, irredentism, partition. 
Introduction 
To what extent was the Irish peace settlement of 1998 a radical new departure arising from 
the negotiating skills of those who were party to it, or was it a predictable—or even 
inevitable—consequence of steady ideological change on the island of Ireland? The path-
breaking nature of the Good Friday agreement has been widely acknowledged. As one 
Northern Ireland Secretary put it, it was “a major achievement” which “repaired many of the 
faults of the 1920-21 Anglo-Irish settlement”, and “drew on the creative and constructive 
elements of every political initiative and movement of the past 200 years”.1 Since it was 
negotiated in 1998, it has attracted near-universal support across the political spectrum. Its 
role in paving the way for Irish unity has been stressed by its nationalist supporters, notably 
Sinn Féin.2 In the words of one of the agreement’s principal architects, Bertie Ahern, it could 
play a central part in the process of attaining Irish unity: “for the first time, a precise 
mechanism for achieving a united Ireland, which is possible only with the consent of the Irish 
people, has been defined and accepted by all sides”.3 
Cold water has, however, been poured on the potential contribution that the Republic of 
Ireland might play in the process of attaining Irish unity. A persuasive analysis of official Irish 
discourse in the last three decades of the twentieth century argued that “the Irish 
governmental elite has relied heavily on nationalist discourse to bolster the impression of 
adherence to a 32 county ideal whilst conducting an essentially 26 county-based policy”.4 In 
other words, the reinterpretation and re-presentation of traditional nationalist rhetoric gave 
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cover for a shift, in reality, from traditional nationalist priorities to a more unreserved 
accommodation with the political reality of partition. 
This article argues that, while this redefinition of nationalist vocabulary was indeed widely 
shared by the southern political elites (defined as the leadership of the major parties, but 
extending also to senior civil servants) in the quarter century leading to the Good Friday 
agreement, it had deeper roots in Irish political history. The new interpretation of the issue of 
partition and Irish unity associated with the Good Friday agreement was not a fresh 
departure, but represented the culmination of a set of ideological changes and shifts in policy 
priorities that had been going on throughout the twentieth century. In particular, it amounted 
to a sharp (if largely unremarked) reversal of state policy on Northern Ireland, which had 
called, in the rhetoric of its leaders and the phraseology of its constitution, for Irish unity. The 
article aims to explore how this change took place at elite level. 
Rather than adopting a chronological approach, the article addresses three themes in the 
process of ideological and policy transition, moving from the most structurally adventurous to 
the most subtle. The first is the pursuit of the politically ambitious but only occasionally 
salient goal of Irish unity, implying the short, sharp imposition of an all-Ireland state, justified 
as vindication of the collective wishes of the Irish people. The second is the more modest but 
more sustained question of functional North-South cooperation and the incremental creation 
of over-arching institutions, based on and promoting the construction of trust between the 
peoples of the two parts of the island. The third is associated with the tension between these 
approaches, in that the strategies of coercive unity and voluntary collaboration rest on 
conflicting interpretations of the rights of those living on either side of the border: the issue of 
definition and redefinition of the status of Northern Ireland. In the case of each theme, the 
article traces evolution from an initially uncompromisingly irredentist position to de facto and, 
ultimately, de jure acceptance of the status quo. 
The goal of Irish unity 
The irony of the installation of a unionist “home rule” administration in Northern Ireland in 
1921 immediately constrained the options facing the southern elites following agreement on 
the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921. Essentially, the Treaty offered three mechanisms that opened 
the prospect of a restoration of Irish unity. One, the creation of a Council of Ireland, 
presented as an embryonic Irish parliament, is discussed in the next section. A second was a 
formal provision of articles 11 and 12 of the Treaty to the effect that the jurisdiction of the 
Irish Free State would extend over all 32 counties, but that Northern Ireland could opt out 
within one month of enactment of the Treaty (this “Ulster month” was later interpreted as 
meaning one month after the formal birth of the Irish Free State). A 32-county independent 
Irish Free State thus came into existence on 6 December 1922, when its new constitution 
was proclaimed. The following day, the Northern Ireland House of Commons and Senate 
petitioned the King “that the powers of the Parliament and Government of the Irish Free State 
shall no longer extend to Northern Ireland”.5 This brought to a decisive end, after one day, 
the brief history of the 32-county Irish Free State, replacing it by its familiar 26-county 
version. 
Northern Ireland’s opting out triggered a third mechanism, for which provision was made in 
article 12 of the Treaty: the appointment of a three-person commission to “determine in 
accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants, so far as may be compatible with economic 
and geographic conditions, the boundaries between Northern Ireland and the rest of Ireland”. 
The southern negotiators of the Treaty had placed great faith in the belief that this provision 
would bring Northern Ireland to heel. They apparently believed that it was likely that the 
egregiously unfair line of the boundary between Northern Ireland and the South (which 
allocated two predominantly Catholic and nationalist counties, and other sizeable Catholic 
districts, to Northern Ireland) would be rectified by means of a boundary adjustment so 
substantial that it would make the northern state unviable.6 The failure of the commission 
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ultimately to make any such recommendation, and the leaking in 1925 of its draft report, 
which proposed only minor changes to the existing border and, to the dismay of nationalists, 
the transfer of some territory to Northern Ireland, provoked a political crisis in Dublin.7 This 
culminated in a tripartite agreement between Dublin, London and Belfast in 1925 to shelve 
the report and adhere to the existing line of the border, as discussed in the next section. 
The southern government appears not to have assessed carefully the implications of the 
boundary commission, whose terms of reference (and especially the question as to how far 
economic and geographic considerations might outweigh the wishes of the inhabitants) have 
been criticised as too open-ended for clear interpretation, making this “a classic case study 
of a poorly-planned boundary commission”.8 This overlooks the fact that in several other 
border disputes in post-1918 Europe account also had to be taken of economic and 
geographic factors, but a more fair-minded approach that sought to assess popular 
preferences by plebiscite resulted in widespread acceptance of the outcome.9 The southern 
representative on the Commission, the Minister for Education, Eoin MacNeill, displayed none 
of the single-mindedness of his northern counterpart, and appears to have been out-
manoeuvred. The whole episode suggests policy incoherence, in that in early 1923 the Free 
State government was already working on the consolidation of the existing border by 
establishing customs posts—“an anomalous example of a phase of boundary administration 
actually predating final boundary delimitation”.10 Even had the territory of Northern Ireland 
been drastically reduced, though, there is little evidence that this would have compromised 
its viability. County Antrim alone was a good deal larger in area and population than the Free 
City of Danzig, which came into existence as an autonomous state in 1920, and much larger 
than Gibraltar, another small but enduring entity that should have been familiar to Irish 
leaders.11 But there is also evidence that if a plebiscite had taken place along the lines of 
those that had recently been conducted in East Prussia, Upper Silesia, Schleswig and 
Klagenfurt, the result might have been less favourable to nationalists than the data in the 
1911 census used by the boundary commission.12 
The central issue in the South at this time was the failure of the new Irish state to establish its 
complete independence of the UK, not the success of Ulster unionists in excluding six 
counties from its writ. This was reflected in the Dáil debate on the 1921 Treaty, which 
concentrated on “the crown, the oath and the empire”, with no more than “fleeting reference” 
to the Northern Ireland question, a topic that took up no more than nine of the 338 pages that 
reported the Treaty debates.13 This reflected the reality of southern perspectives on the 
North: “Dáil deputies, and later IRA members, had more interest in the status of the new 
Ireland than in its size”.14 Much of the history of the subsequent years was dominated by the 
efforts of the new state to differentiate itself further from the United Kingdom—even if that 
also meant reinforcing the border with Northern Ireland. The burning issue was “sovereignty, 
not unity”, and “what mattered above all was Dublin’s relations with London, not Dublin’s 
relations with Belfast”.15 Dublin’s focus shifted decisively away from Northern Ireland, a 
circumstance aggravated by the death in August 1922 of Michael Collins, one of the few 
southern political leaders with a “genuine and consistent concern for Irish unity and the 
welfare of the northern nationalists”.16 
Formally, however, the goal of Irish unity remained supreme, at least at the rhetorical level, 
for the first five decades of the life of the new Irish state. This was reflected in party 
programmes and constitutions. The new pro-Treaty governing party, which by 1923 had 
adopted the name Cumann na nGaedheal, gave unity first place in its list of objectives: “to 
secure the unity of Ireland and to combine the divergent elements of the nation in a common 
bond of citizenship in harmony with national security”.17 When the party merged in 1933 with 
two smaller groups, the new party formed in the merger adopted the politically pointed name 
“United Ireland Party”, though within a few years it began to be better known by its Irish 
name, Fine Gael.18 The Labour Party initially sought to maintain a difficult balance that could 
accommodate a diversity of views, because of its links with the labour movement in Northern 
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Ireland.19 But it was also heir to the executed 1916 leader James Connolly, and in the mid-
1930s the nationalist position was formally incorporated in the party constitution.20 
On the anti-Treaty side, the Fianna Fáil party defined Irish unity as its primary aim from its 
foundation in 1926; its first objective was “to secure the unity and independence of Ireland as 
a Republic”. The party’s subsequent history, however, showed little engagement with this 
issue; its position up to 1971 has been persuasively described as “a mixture of outdated, 
piecemeal and short-term ad-hoc policies”, with the party offering an entirely misleading 
image of commitment to the pursuit of unity.21 From a practical perspective, its founding 
leader, de Valera, was wedded to a formula he first outlined on 14 December 1921 as an 
alternative to the Treaty. This was to play a later role as a model for redefining the Irish-
British relationship and, indeed, for restructuring relationships within the Commonwealth.22 It 
departed from the terms of the Treaty mainly by proposing association with rather than 
membership of the Commonwealth, by reducing the role of the King and by asserting a more 
independent position in respect of military matters.23 Most surprisingly, it left intact the 
proposal in the Treaty that Northern Ireland be allowed to opt out within one month.24 This, 
however, was dropped in a later version of the document, intended for presentation to the 
Dáil on 4 Jan. 1922, and published in the Freeman’s Journal the following day. This became 
known, rather misleadingly, as “document no. 2”, and provided for the incorporation of 
Northern Ireland as an autonomous entity within Ireland.25 A mechanism for achieving this 
was written into the 1937 constitution by de Valera; the otherwise puzzling article 15.2.2° 
states that “provision may however be made by law for the creation or recognition of 
subordinate legislatures and for the powers and functions of these legislatures”, a federative-
type arrangement designed to allow Northern Ireland to continue with its existing institutions, 
while those retained by Westminster would be transferred to Dublin. 
As well as this provision, the 1937 constitution addressed the question of partition more 
explicitly. Article 2 defined the “national territory” as consisting of “the whole island of Ireland, 
its islands and the territorial seas”, while article 3 asserted the Irish government’s right “to 
exercise jurisdiction over the whole territory”. It is not clear whether this was an elegant way 
of “parking” the Northern Ireland question by “resolving” it at the level of the constitution (thus 
allowing Irish governments to get on with the administration of their 26-county state) or a 
genuine device for achieving unity. If the latter, then de Valera’s attitude is puzzling when at 
two critical moments in the second world war (after the fall of France in 1940, and after Pearl 
Harbour in 1941) he rejected British overtures that appeared to offer Irish unity in return for 
Irish participation in the war.26 It is unclear whether de Valera’s rejection of these approaches 
was based on doubts about British sincerity, about Britain’s capacity to deliver, or about the 
abandonment of the recently declared policy of Irish neutrality.27 But it demonstrated that 
there were obvious limits to the weight de Valera attached to the value of Irish unity. 
Nevertheless, the federative approach remained a cornerstone of Fianna Fáil policy. As 
Sean Lemass, who took over as Taoiseach from de Valera in 1959, put it 
I would regard as an honourable solution of this national problem, an arrangement on the 
lines of the proposal put forward on behalf of Dáil Éireann prior to the Treaty negotiations 
of 1921 and repeated on many occasions since, involving, subject to safeguards, the 
confirmation of the position of the Northern Ireland legislature with its existing powers 
within an all-Ireland constitution, for so long as the people of the north-eastern counties 
might desire it.28 
Substantial consensus between the parties was reflected in the All-Party Anti-Partition 
Conference. Established in January 1949 on the initiative of the new Minister for External 
Affairs, Sean McBride, and including his own Clann na Poblachta party as well as Fianna 
Fáil, Fine Gael and Labour, its objective was to disseminate the traditional irredentist 
message rather than to rethink it.29 Its policy statement rehearsed traditional nationalist 
arguments, describing partition as a “denial of the right to self-determination”, essentially 
accusing the British government of ignoring and obstructing the will of a majority of the 
people of Ireland.30 
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Notwithstanding conciliatory moves in the mid-1960s, the outbreak of civil unrest in 1968 
resulted initially in restatement of traditional positions, with the Taoiseach, Jack Lynch seeing 
the appropriate course as “to eliminate the root cause of dissension among Irishmen in the 
North—that is, the Partition of our country against the wishes of the overwhelming majority of 
the Irish people".31 This continued to be his position in talks with the British Prime Minister on 
30 October 1968.32 It was to be seen also among senior members of Lynch’s cabinet, who 
were accused in 1970 of involvement in the illegal importation of arms for transfer to 
Northern Ireland in a traumatic event that became known as the “arms crisis”.33 
In many respects, though, this episode represented one of the last outbursts of traditional 
irredentism within the main parties. Lynch’s occasionally bellicose references to partition 
were interleaved by more conciliatory language stressing the need for North-South 
agreement and eschewing any idea of coercing Northern Ireland.34 In any case, the political 
and socio-economic realities exposed by the Northern Ireland conflict forced the government 
in the Republic to reconsider its stance on Irish unity and pushed the governing party, Fianna 
Fáil, into undertaking a fundamental re-evaluation of its policy.35 This reconsideration 
extended also to the two main opposition parties, which had been moving steadily away from 
the traditional nationalist consensus.36 Within Fine Gael, which was traditionally less 
assertive on the question of Irish unity, Garret FitzGerald (future party leader and Taoiseach, 
and himself with a strong Northern Ireland background through his mother, a northern 
Protestant nationalist) successfully proposed change in 1972. This new approach was based 
on a more thoughtful and politically nuanced programme in relation to Northern Ireland, 
emphasising the need for agreement.37 At the same time, the views of the most outspoken 
member of the Labour Party, Conor Cruise O’Brien, acquired a position of dominance in 
party thinking on Northern Ireland, with his advocacy of a cooperative North-South 
relationship and abandonment of propaganda for unity, which would become a long-term 
aspiration.38 
These ideological shifts reflected a more hard-headed understanding of existing realities. As 
the violence began to escalate in Northern Ireland in 1970, the Lynch government asked the 
Irish army to investigate the feasibility of military intervention. The army’s conclusion was that 
no more than 2,500 troops would be available for such a mission, and that they would face 
forces “vastly superior in strength, organisation, combat training and equipment”.39 While the 
notion of military intervention was abandoned forthwith, another danger appeared on the 
horizon: the risk of a British withdrawal, which became a realistic possibility in 1974-75 and 
prompted the Irish government to stress to the British, ironically in light of decades of 
irredentist rhetoric, the catastrophic consequences that might follow, given limited Irish 
government resources to cope with the heightened level of violence that they believed would 
erupt in these circumstances.40 
It could be argued that the swan song of southern Irish irredentism was represented by the 
New Ireland Forum of 1983-84. Convened by the Taoiseach, Garret FitzGerald, and 
comprising representatives of the three principal southern parties and the main northern 
nationalist party, the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), it was the most sustained 
attempt since partition to work out a nationalist consensus on the future.41 It identified three 
political models: a unitary Irish state, a federal or confederal Ireland, and joint rule over 
Northern Ireland by the British and Irish governments.42 Under pressure from Fianna Fáil 
leader Charlies Haughey, it adopted the model of a unitary state as its preferred option.43 
Nothing like this had been advocated in the context of Irish independence by any leading 
political group or individual since the nineteenth century, and it was so far removed from 
political reality that it received little further consideration. Even the less demanding federal 
and confederal options fell off the menu of British-Irish negotiations that began in the mid-
1980s. In any case, the perspectives of the parties had moved far towards recognising the 
need for agreement with Northern Ireland. This had been stressed by Fine Gael and Labour 
since the early 1970s; and in 1995 Fianna Fáil, which had been making a gradual transition 
Coakley / Adjusting to Partition  p. 6 
in a less irredentist direction, formally changed its first basic aim, so that it was now “to 
secure in peace and agreement the unity of Ireland and its people”.44 
The Council of Ireland concept 
There was a tension between the pursuit of Irish unity (seen as giving Dublin a decisive voice 
in the government of the entire island, even if autonomous institutions were to survive in 
Belfast) and mechanisms for North-South cooperation such as the 1920 Council of Ireland 
(which implied accepting not just partition, but also equality between the two parts of the 
island). It is true that the latter formula could be presented as the embryo of a united Ireland, 
to be achieved in steady stages—a strategy that as applied later to the European integration 
process would be labelled “functionalist”.45 
The Government of Ireland Act, 1920, which first prescribed this mechanism for sugaring the 
bitter pill of partition, indeed conformed to the gradualist interpretation. Clause 2 (1) provided 
for the creation of a 40-member Council of Ireland, drawn equally from the Northern and 
Southern parliaments, “with a view to the eventual establishment of a Parliament for the 
whole of Ireland” and to promote contact and cooperation between North and South. In the 
meantime, it would have responsibility for just a few areas (private bill legislation, railways, 
fisheries and infectious diseases of animals), though other areas could be transferred if the 
northern and southern authorities so agreed. 
This initiative was, however, overtaken by events. Although the new Northern Ireland 
parliament selected its 20 members of the Council on 23 June 1921, its southern counterpart 
was rendered entirely ineffective. The Treaty of 1921 dealt the Council a significant blow: it 
led to the disappearance of the major all-Ireland institutions with which the Council was 
linked, including the offices of Lord Lieutenant and Lord Chancellor, the Irish Privy Council 
(of which both northern and southern ministers would have been members) and the High 
Court of Appeal for Ireland. The Treaty also transferred the functions of the Council in 
respect of the Irish Free State to that state, leaving intact only those relating to Northern 
Ireland. The fact that the Council’s powers in relation to Northern Ireland had been reserved 
to the British government caused practical difficulties, as in the case of Irish government’s 
efforts to consolidate the railway system in 1924. In the course of the debate on the Railways 
Bill, government hostility to the Council of Ireland was clear; the Attorney General, Hugh 
Kennedy warned that “the Council of Ireland was the creation of the Government of Ireland 
Act, 1920, which we have always refused to recognise”, and that retaining it would have 
negative consequences.46 A month later, the Labour Party tried to force action to be taken on 
the Council, but it was comfortably outvoted by Cumann na nGaedheal.47 
The crisis associated with the Boundary Commission debacle in 1925 finally killed off the 
Council. The Irish, Northern Irish and British governments agreed on 3 December 1925 not 
only to suppress the boundary commission’s report and accept the existing line of the border, 
but also to abolish the Council of Ireland, transferring its remaining functions to Northern 
Ireland, and to offer a package to the Irish Free State in respect of its financial liabilities 
under the Treaty.48 This represented a significant re-orientation of the nationalist position, 
with the Irish government not only abandoning the concept of institutionalised links with 
Northern Ireland, but also distancing itself further from the nationalist minority there.49 As 
Vice President Kevin O’Higgins put it during negotiations with the British, his government 
would be able to survive the shock of the boundary commission’s award only if either the 
conditions of Northern Ireland Catholics were improved or the British were to make “some 
form of concession by which they would be able to deaden in the 26 counties the echo of the 
outcry of the Catholics in North-East Ireland”. In settling for a financial deal, the Irish 
government acknowledged that it was “open to the taunt of having sold the Roman Catholics 
in Northern Ireland”.50 
The Dáil debate on the 1925 agreement offers a revealing insight into southern views of the 
Council of Ireland. Ministers lined up to belittle its value, especially as amended by the 
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Treaty. President Cosgrave saw nothing to be lost by abandoning this structure; Desmond 
FitzGerald described it as an “irritant” that would be an obstacle to unity; Kevin O’Higgins 
criticised it as having “a kind of mutilated and lopsided existence”; Ernest Blythe dismissed it 
as “a body which would have done no good and might have done harm”; and ministers 
Hogan and McGilligan were similarly dismissive. In this, the Government was supported by 
Farmers’ Party leader Denis Gorey (who said that the Council “serves no purpose 
whatsoever”) and two prominent independents from unionist backgrounds, Bryan Cooper 
(who said that it “could never have achieved anything of permanent value”) and Professor 
William Thrift (who described it as “a bond of unity in the sense in which a handcuff is a bond 
between a prisoner and his jailer”). From the Government side, only Richard Mulcahy 
admitted to having “some misgivings” over the abolition, while his colleague Professor 
William Magennis (who resigned from Cumann na nGaedheal over the boundary commission 
issue) was also critical. A single speaker predictably offered a considered defence of the 
Council of Ireland: Labour leader Thomas Johnson described it as keeping open the door to 
Irish unity, and criticised its abolition as giving effect to a “complete and absolute severance” 
of links between the two parts of Ireland of a kind never contemplated while the treaty was 
being debated.51 
The 1925 debate set the tone for the following decades. The Council was not just an 
uncomfortable reminder of partition, but, with its equal representation from the two states, 
implied parity between an independent state and a region of the UK. Belated regrets over the 
abandonment of the Council, and proposals for its resuscitation, were nevertheless 
occasionally to be heard. For example, in 1947 Fine Gael’s Eamonn Coogan, calling for an 
opening up of dialogue with Northern Ireland to pave the way for unity, commented on the 
casual manner in which this institution had been set aside.52 Shortly afterwards, Senator 
James Douglas called for a Council of Ireland modelled on the Council of Europe.53 The 
Dublin Central branch of Fine Gael made a similar call at the party’s 1954 ard-fheis.54 
Indeed, de Valera himself referred favourably to the old Council of Ireland in the course of a 
Seanad debate on a resolution of Professor W.B. Stanford calling for the promotion of social, 
economic and cultural co-operation with Northern Ireland—a debate showing the strong 
influence of a young lawyer, Donal Barrington, who called for a new policy of engagement 
with Northern Ireland.55 
Notwithstanding commitments in the 1925 agreement that the two governments would meet 
“as and when necessary” to consider matters of common interest in the areas where the 
Council of Ireland would have functioned, the two parts of Ireland subsequently went their 
separate ways, though a reasonable level of political and official contact was maintained up 
to 1932.56 Following the change in government in that year, however, such contacts 
continued only at official level, and were confined to areas where they could hardly have 
been avoided: the generation and distribution of electricity, cross-border railways, and 
management of shared fisheries.57 The flavour at political level is conveyed by the Northern 
Ireland government’s reaction to a proposed visit by de Valera to Co. Down in 1938; it 
pointed out that “the expulsion order against Mr de Valera of some years back was still in 
force”.58 
It was only a thaw in the North-South “cold war” in the 1960s that permitted a normalisation 
of relations. Subsequent developments fell under the umbrella of two strands that were later 
to become familiar themes in the negotiation of a settlement: Ireland’s relationship with the 
United Kingdom, and Northern Ireland’s relationship with the Republic.59 Much of the 
momentum of the new approach was driven by economic considerations, culminating in the 
signing of a landmark Anglo-Irish Free Trade Agreement on 14 December 1965. Efforts to 
improve the political climate followed. On the proposal of Francis Noel-Baker, a British 
Labour MP, formal links between the Irish and British parliaments were established in 1966 
under the auspices of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, and an Irish-British Parliamentary 
Group was created.60 It adopted a constitution on 27 April 1966, and had attracted the 
affiliation of 69 members of the Oireachtas (one third of the total) by 1969.61 
Coakley / Adjusting to Partition  p. 8 
Parallel to this, a rather more visible rapprochement with Northern Ireland was facilitated by 
the warmer political atmosphere marked by the succession of Sean Lemass (1959) and 
Terence O’Neill (1963) as southern and northern prime ministers.62 A vital role was played by 
the civil servant most associated with the re-direction of Irish policy, Ken Whitaker—himself 
born in what would become Northern Ireland.63 Although Lemass formally supported de 
Valera’s federative formula, his new policy was “to build brotherly regard and respect for the 
national heritage, and to promote agreements which will result in practical benefits while 
helping to emphasise the basic similarity of the problems and possibilities in all areas of 
Ireland, and the advantages of working in unison”.64 
The most dramatic outcome was Sean Lemass’s visit to Stormont on 14 January 1965, 
followed by a reciprocal visit by O’Neill to Dublin on 2 February. The matter-of-fact nature of 
these meetings, and of the ministerial ones that followed (which focused on 14 areas of 
potential cooperation), was reflected in the fact that even O’Neill’s hardline predecessor, 
Brookeborough, quietly gave O’Neill his blessing: “I do not think that either the Constitution or 
Protestantism is threatened in any way. This is purely a question of the economic welfare 
and happiness of the two countries”.65 The atmosphere in the ministerial talks was 
businesslike and friendly, with, in the words of a northern official about a meeting in January 
1968, “no hint from the Southern side of any topic which could conceivably have any 
embarrassing political or constitutional implications”.66 
Calls for formalising the relationship had followed the Lemass-O’Neill talks. Thus, the Irish 
Times interpreted Lemass’s visit as implicit recognition of Northern Ireland and as opening 
the way to a possible Council of Ireland, and similar suggestions were made by private 
individuals.67 The idea was not, however, pushed by the Irish government, and in any case 
O’Neill dismissed it as premature.68 The Irish Government was more reserved on a proposal 
for an “Irish Parliamentary Union”, linking North and South, comparable with the Irish-British 
one. The Minister for External Affairs, Frank Aiken, preferred informal contact between 
northern and southern parliamentarians, and this view was shared by his departmental 
secretary, Hugh McCann, who feared that “for some time to come relations with the North will 
be delicate and sensitive and whether all parliamentarians could be relied on to bring the 
necessary degree of circumspection, tact and prudence to bear on the problems might be 
open to doubt”.69 Cooperation through such mechanisms as a Council of Ireland, and any 
symmetrical federal model, were seen as hazardous, since they implied equal status for 
Northern Ireland with the Republic.70 
The new policy of intergovernmental cooperation and de facto mutual recognition had 
practical consequences that northern nationalists found alarming: Stormont would continue in 
its existing, unreformed manner. As Aiken had put it privately in early 1965, northern 
nationalists should be encouraged to make the best of their current position within Northern 
Ireland and accept its British culture, including such irritants to nationalists as ubiquitous 
“loyal toasts”.71 Northern nationalists were deeply offended when in October 1967 Lemass, 
now in retirement, called on them to accept their position and adopt a more flexible attitude to 
the state; as he saw it, the onus was on minorities to adapt, as Ireland’s southern Protestant 
minority had done.72 As Nationalist Party leader Eddie McAteer put it, “you are penned into a 
ghetto and then blamed for being in the ghetto”.73 
The explosion of Catholic grievance reflected in the outbreak of civil unrest made 
reconsideration of traditional policy necessary. Fresh Irish government thinking on Northern 
Ireland was kicked off in late 1969 by a group of officials led by Ken Whitaker, who outlined a 
wide and imaginative range of options for institutionalised North-South and British-Irish links, 
including also Europe-related options.74 Shortly afterwards, on 27 May 1970, the government 
appointed a small “Inter-Departmental Unit” (IDU) to advise on Northern Ireland policy and to 
explore constitutional options.75 Drawn from the departments of the Taoiseach, External 
Affairs and Finance, one of its earliest tasks was to explore the possible shape that a Council 
of Ireland might take.76 This idea also attracted interest outside Irish government circles. The 
notion of a Council of Ireland was floated by a leading Labour peer, Lord Longford, in 
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October 1969.77 An influential Irish Times columnist, Michael McInerney, also proposed this 
formula in January 1970, and six months later it was taken up by the National Democratic 
Party, a precursor to the SDLP.78 In May 1971, J.C. Beckett, a distinguished professor of 
history in Queen’s University Belfast, made the original suggestion that a Council of Ireland 
could be established by amendment of article 3 of the Irish constitution.79 
The suspension of devolved government in Northern Ireland in March 1972 gave this 
discussion more immediacy. A “Future Policy Group” of senior northern civil servants came 
together to examine long-term constitutional options, including Irish unity, and produced a set 
of thoughtful policy papers.80 The idea of institutionalised North-South links was formally put 
forward by the British Government in its discussion document or “green paper” of 30 October 
1972 and in a policy “white paper” on 20 March 1973. The Sunningdale conference that 
followed on 6-9 December 1973 brought together the British and Irish governments and the 
three parties which had agreed to form a power-sharing executive in Northern Ireland. It 
resulted in an agreement on a blueprint very similar to that proposed by the IDU: a Council of 
Ireland comprising a ministerial body with equal representation from North and South, a 
parliamentary tier drawn from the Northern Ireland Assembly and the Dáil, and a standing 
secretariat. The big question concerned its functions. The IDU prepared an ambitious list, but 
encountered relatively little enthusiasm among Irish government departments.81 As one of 
the Northern Ireland civil servants involved in the process drily remarked, the list of areas 
proposed for transfer gave the impression of “departments protecting themselves”, adding 
that “what is involved is a largely symbolic transfer of the responsibility of secondary bodies 
to the Council of Ireland, leaving the departments largely unscathed”.82 Foreign Affairs 
Minister Garret FitzGerald put this down to a partitionist mentality among southern civil 
servants, who tended to see the Council of Ireland as “some kind of external threat to the 
institutions of the state”.83 
The proposed Council never came into existence, and disappeared with the collapse of one 
of its legs, the power-sharing executive, on 28 May 1974 under pressure from the Ulster 
Workers’ Council strike. This experience left a lasting legacy, one which showed a 
remarkable shift in nationalist discourse as represented by the southern political elites. This 
change was conditioned by recognition of certain undeniable realities: the vehemence of 
Protestant opposition to Irish unity, the autonomous path of development taken by northern 
nationalism in the 1970s and later that differentiated its priorities from those of the south, and 
the huge costs—economic, political and even military—that the Republic would have to bear 
were it to pursue successfully a campaign for Irish unity. In particular, though, the collapse of 
the Sunningdale arrangements in May 1974 had demonstrated the very considerable 
resources that unionists could mobilise against their perceived enemies; and fears of a 
British withdrawal in 1974-75 heightened Irish government anxieties about involvement in the 
administration of Northern Ireland. There was, then, a sharp shift in Irish government thinking 
on Northern Ireland. A discussion paper in June 1974 suggested that, as well as 
investigating the possibility of United Nations involvement, the government should “exert 
pressure, discreetly, directly and indirectly e.g. through EEC partners and others on the 
British to continue direct rule”, and that it should “conduct here a discreet educational 
exercise among the public on the (1) security, and (2) economic consequences of a British 
withdrawal”.84 
Following the setback of 1974, the idea of North-South institutional links was put on the long 
finger; indeed, the impossibility of putting power sharing institutions in place in Northern 
Ireland seemed to remove a prerequisite to such links. In these circumstances, the Irish 
government moved to a different level—a direct relationship with London—rather than 
focusing primarily on the North-South relationship. The outcome was the Anglo-Irish 
agreement of 1985, which created an Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Conference, serviced by 
a permanent secretariat, which would discuss matters of shared interest at head of 
government, ministerial and official level. In particular, this arrangement would give the Irish 
government a voice in the political affairs of Northern Ireland. Parallel to this, a parliamentary 
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tier was established in 1990—the British-Irish Interparliamentary Body, its members drawn 
equally from the British and Irish parliaments.85 As in the 1960s, East-West collaboration 
seemed to present a more manageable challenge than North-South cooperation. 
The Good Friday agreement of 1998 redefined these structures and introduced new ones.86 
The new structures, with an Assembly and Executive at their core, were mainly focused on 
devolved government within Northern Ireland. But in addition to changes at this level, now 
labelled “strand one”, two other strands were identified. The second referred to the North-
South dimension, where a small set of North-South “implementation bodies” was established, 
alongside an overarching North/South Ministerial Council with a permanent secretariat, and 
with provision for cooperation in other areas. The range of areas was considerably less than 
those identified in 1974; but, unlike the earlier experience, perhaps because of the modesty 
of the areas covered, the institutions themselves have functioned effectively. A joint 
parliamentary forum linking the two jurisdictions was planned, but came into existence only in 
2012 as the North/South Interparliamentary Association; a planned parallel consultative 
forum representing civil society interests never took shape. 
By contrast with the slow pace of progress in strand two, strand three has shown greater 
vigour. The British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference that replaced the Anglo-Irish 
Intergovernmental Conference created in 1985 receded in importance as power was 
devolved to the new institutions in Belfast; since the restoration of devolution in 2007 it has 
not met. The Irish part of its secretariat nevertheless continues to give the Irish government a 
presence in Belfast, and alternative channels of British-Irish communication have developed 
(notably, the Permanent Secretaries and Secretaries General Group, set up in 2013 to bring 
together senior civil servants from London and Dublin). The Good Friday agreement also 
established a British-Irish Council, including the governments of the two sovereign states, the 
three devolved administrations of the United Kingdom, and the three crown dependences of 
Jersey, Guernsey and the Isle of Man. Parallel to this, the parliamentary forum expanded its 
membership to include all of these jurisdictions, and in 2008 it was re-designated the British-
Irish Parliamentary Assembly.87 
Thus, nothing as ambitious as the Council of Ireland provided for in the Sunningdale 
agreement was to emerge later. Seamus Mallon’s quip that the Good Friday agreement was 
“Sunningdale for slow learners” gives a misleading impression of the similarities between the 
North/South Ministerial Council of 1998, with its strictly limited jurisdiction, and the promise 
that Irish policy makers saw in the Council of Ireland of 1973-74, even if the latter never 
came into existence. 
The status of Northern Ireland 
Changes in the position of the Republic’s political leadership on the so-called “national 
question” were reflected in a shift in principle in relation to a more fundamental issue. 
Running alongside the debate about Irish unity and the discussion of proposals for 
institutionalised North-South cooperation ran a more fundamental and generally 
subterranean (but occasional overt) disagreement about the status of Northern Ireland and, 
indeed, about the status of the jurisdictions that laid claim to it. There were two aspects to 
this: the relatively superficial (but diplomatically challenging) issue of state nomenclature, and 
the question of formal recognition of the territorial integrity of neighbouring states. 
The official title of the state of which Ireland was a part until 1922, as defined in 1801 in the 
royal title, was “the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland”. The Government of Ireland 
Act, 1920, proclaimed two new autonomous entities of equal status within this, Southern 
Ireland and Northern Ireland. The latter came into existence in 1921; the former never 
effectively existed and was superseded by the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921. On 6 December 
1922, the United Kingdom was disrupted by the departure of the whole island of Ireland, 
marked by the appearance of a new dominion, the Irish Free State. On the following day, 
however, in a pre-arranged piece of constitutional choreography, Northern Ireland left the 
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Irish Free State to return to the United Kingdom. The designation “Irish Free State” 
subsequently referred to the 26 counties of independent Ireland only. Nevertheless, the 
British government continued to acknowledge the integrity of the island of Ireland. This was 
reflected in the change in the royal title made necessary by the end of the union of 1801: in 
1927 “United Kingdom” was dropped, and the King’s jurisdiction was redefined, using 
“O’Higgins’s comma” (so called after the Irish external affairs minister who negotiated this) as 
“Great Britain, Ireland”, and his other dominions.88 This formula survived the retitling of the 
Irish Free State as “Éire, or, in the English language, Ireland” in the 1937 constitution, and 
even the creation in that constitution of the office of President of Ireland, an internatioinal 
anomaly whose functions were wholly domestic.89 
Although the President of Ireland and the King of Ireland were to coexist for over a decade, 
this balancing act did not survive the decision of a new coalition government in 1948 to 
terminate the King’s role in external affairs and to sever remaining links with the 
Commonwealth. The Republic of Ireland Act, 1948, transferred the King’s functions in 
external relations (signing the credentials of heads of Irish diplomatic missions, accepting 
letters of credence from external governments, and signing treaties) to the President, 
terminating the ambiguous position that had lasted up to then, and introduced “Republic of 
Ireland” as the “description” (not the name!) of the state. This brought to a head tensions 
over the naming isssue. The Irish government insisted that for international purposes the 
country would be represented by the “President of Ireland”; the British flatly refused to accept 
this designation, but were prepared to accept “Éire” (which by now was widely seen outside 
the state as referring to the 26 counties only), or “Irish Republic”, or, at a pinch, “Republic of 
Ireland”. Another consequence was the practice of completing British-Irish treaties “in two 
originals” rather than in duplicate: the Irish version referred to “Ireland” and “the United 
Kingdom”; the British version to “the Republic of Ireland” and “the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland”.90 
The dispute over nomenclature reflected a more profound failure of the two states to accept 
each other’s boundaries.91 The British position was complex. As already indicated, the 
Government of Ireland Act, 1920, indicated support for Irish unity in the long term, though 
within the framework of the United Kingdom. British governments of course recognised the 
Free State’s dominion status, but could do little to prevent Irish governments, especially after 
de Valera’s accession to power in 1932, from dismantling most of the constitutional links with 
the United Kingdom. Even the territorial statement in the Irish constitution of 1937 drew no 
legal response from the British side. The Republic of Ireland Act, 1948, however, implied a 
complete break with the United Kingdom, one that by implication extended to all 32 counties. 
The British responded with the Ireland Act, 1949. This appeared to underwrite partition more 
completely than ever before, giving a veto to the Northern Ireland parliament over its status 
within the United Kingdom: “in no event will Northern Ireland or any part thereof cease to be 
part of His Majesty’s dominions and of the United Kingdom without the consent of the 
Parliament of Northern Ireland”. The Act did not, as is sometimes suggested, in any way 
grant Northern Ireland the right to leave the United Kingdom. But since it prevented the 
British parliament from even adjusting the border of Northern Ireland without the consent of 
the “subordinate parliament” in Belfast, “the boundary acquired an air of permanence and of 
rigidity in law which it had not hitherto possessed.”92 
At a political level, this commitment was repeated by successive prime ministers: Atlee did so 
in 1948, affirming that it was British government policy that “no change should be made in 
the constitutional status of Northern Ireland without Northern Ireland’s free agreement”, and 
Wilson repeated this assurance in 1965.93 The Northern Ireland government was 
nevertheless worried, since Wilson was reported in January 1967 as saying that “Irish unity 
would have his blessing”.94 Following the outbreak of civil unrest, Wilson restated his pledge 
in October 1968, but added that partition was “a matter for Irish people on both sides of the 
border”.95 The Northern Ireland Constitution Act, 1973, repeated the commitment, but 
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replaced “the consent of the Parliament of Northern Ireland” by “the consent of the majority of 
the people of Northern Ireland voting in a poll”, since the parliament no longer existed. 
Within months, a process of convergence between the British and Irish positions had begun. 
One of the irreversible aspects of the Sunningdale agreement was that while agreed 
institutions were subject to collapse, statements made could not be unsaid, though they 
might later be changed or rejected. At Sunningdale, the British position was formally stated: 
The British Government solemnly declared that it was, and would remain, their policy to 
support the wishes of the majority of the people of Northern Ireland. The present status of 
Northern Ireland is that it is part of the United Kingdom. If in the future the majority of the 
people of Northern Ireland should indicate a wish to become part of a united Ireland, the 
British Government would support that wish.96 
This represented a big change in the British position; it formally declared its willingness to 
see Northern Ireland leave the United Kingdom, subject only to the wishes of a majority there 
(though the expression “the majority” could be seen as referring to the unionist community, 
the definite article implying the support of the “majority community”). For its part, the Irish 
government acknowledged that any change in the status of Northern Ireland could only come 
about if a majority there so wished. However, a clever device was used to ensure that this 
did not imply acceptance of the status of Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom: the 
Irish and British declarations were printed alongside each other, so the Irish declaration did 
not follow the British one, and left Northern Ireland’s status open: 
The Irish Government fully accepted and solemnly declared that there could be no 
change in the status of Northern Ireland until a majority of the people of Northern Ireland 
desired a change in that status.97 
This declaration, ambiguous though it was, was challenged in the High Court by a former 
Fianna Fáil minister, Kevin Boland, on the basis that it was in conflict with the constitution. 
This was rejected by the High Court (in a judgement later upheld by the Supreme Court) 
since, the court held, there had not been an agreement on the status of Northern Ireland, the 
Irish government’s declaration was a statement of policy and referred only to the de facto 
status of Northern Ireland, and in any case the courts had no right to intervene in matters that 
were appropriately the domain of parliament and government.98 This left the Taoiseach, Liam 
Cosgrave, free to offer a political confirmation of what had been agreed, and he made a 
statement in the Dáil that was welcomed by the head of the power-sharing administration in 
Northern Ireland, Brian Faulkner: 
I now therefore solemnly reaffirm that the factual position of Northern Ireland within the 
United Kingdom cannot be changed except by a decision of a majority of the people of 
Northern Ireland. This declaration, I believe, is in accordance with and follows from the 
resolve of all the democratic parties in the Republic that the unity of Ireland is to be 
achieved only by peaceful means and by consent.99 
The next major step was the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985. This included a joint declaration 
which continued to leave the status of Northern Ireland undefined, acknowledged that a 
majority there supported the status quo, but committed the two governments to make 
provision for Irish unity should a majority within Northern Ireland so wish.100 This time, the 
unionist side used the courts in a clever move designed to upset the agreement by 
demonstrating its incompatibility with the Irish constitution. Two members of the Ulster 
Unionist Party, Christopher and Michael McGimpsey, took the case, but the Supreme Court’s 
judgement in 1988 (upholding that of the High Court) was that article 1 of the agreement 
“constitutes a recognition of the de facto situation in Northern Ireland but does so expressly 
without abandoning the claim to the re-integration of the national territory”.101 
The Downing St Declaration of 1993 spelled out further the clearly non-coercive nature of 
any path towards unity, and its principles were written into the Good Friday agreement in 
1998. The British government committed itself to upholding “the democratic wish of the 
greater number of the people of Northern Ireland on the issue of whether they prefer to 
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support the Union or a sovereign united Ireland”, and reiterated that it had “no selfish 
strategic or economic interest in Northern Ireland”. It agreed that “it is for the people of the 
island of Ireland alone, by agreement between the two parts respectively, to exercise their 
right of self-determination on the basis of consent, freely and concurrently given, North and 
South, to bring about a united Ireland”. The Irish government made a reciprocal gesture by 
accepting that “the democratic right of self-determination by the people of Ireland as a whole 
must be achieved and exercised with and subject to the agreement and consent of a majority 
of the people of Northern Ireland”.102 
As well as incorporating these principles, the Good Friday agreement formally recognised the 
legitimacy of “whatever choice is freely exercised by a majority of the people of Northern 
Ireland with regard to its status”, and formally acknowledged Northern Ireland’s status as part 
of the United Kingdom, since “the present wish of a majority of the people of Northern 
Ireland, freely exercised and legitimate, is to maintain the Union”.103 This time, the agreement 
was proofed against the kind of legal challenge that had threatened earlier agreements; the 
Irish constitution was amended by popular referendum, so that article 3.1 now reads 
It is the firm will of the Irish nation, in harmony and friendship, to unite all the people who 
share the territory of the island of Ireland, in all the diversity of their identities and 
traditions, recognising that a united Ireland shall be brought about only by peaceful 
means with the consent of a majority of the people, democratically expressed, in both 
jurisdictions in the island. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the constitution proclaimed in article 3 that unity was “the firm 
will of the Irish nation”, the status of Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom is thus 
unambiguously embedded in the Irish constitution, which now specifies a more demanding 
path to Irish unity (implying support in referenda North and South) than ever previously 
contemplated. In thus endorsing the “principle of consent”, the Irish government was 
subscribing to a quiet redefinition of its traditional position. The crucial change was in effect 
in counting rules: the people who would make a decision on the relationship between North 
and South would now be the people of Northern Ireland (and, separately, the people of the 
Republic), not the people of the whole island.104 
Conclusion 
This article has argued that a radical shift in the perspectives of Irish politicians and senior 
officials in relation to Northern Ireland took place during the course of the twentieth century, a 
process marked by patterns of abrupt change at certain critical periods. This emerges in 
three interrelated areas. First, the programme of Irish unity, once stridently articulated, 
acquired a softer edge, and there appears to have developed a new form of civic nationalism 
in the Republic, one coterminous with the state—a development which has undermined 
support for Irish unity. Second, the intense reluctance to cooperate with Northern Ireland, 
reflected in suspicion of the Council of Ireland project of the 1920s, has been replaced by a 
more benevolent attitude towards North-South cooperation since the 1970s, one which rests 
on acceptance of the reality of partition. Third, commitment to the notion of the island of 
Ireland as the primary decision making unit on matters affecting the island’s future has given 
way to acceptance of the right of the people of Northern Ireland to opt out of all-island 
institutions and to exercise a veto on Irish unity. 
What, then, is the answer to the question posed at the start of this article: to what extent was 
the Good Friday agreement the outcome of skilled negotiation and bargaining at the end of 
the twentieth century, or a function of long-term ideological shifts throughout that century? It 
would be judicious to respond that there is truth in each of these alternative views. The 
historical picture records the sequence of outcomes to deft inter-state diplomacy from 1973 
to 1998, with greatly varying contributions from the main political parties. But these 
negotiations took place within the context of evolving public opinion, with Catholics in 
Northern Ireland showing an increased disposition to accept the union, and public opinion in 
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the South ultimately abandoning the attitudinal ambiguity that had been such a feature of the 
pre-1969 period to embrace instead the geopolitical status quo. As events showed, the 
official ideological position of the southern state was brittle. More than a generation ago, one 
acute observer detected an “ironic role reversal” in attitudes in the Republic towards Northern 
Ireland, resembling that of the British towards Ireland under the Act of Union: 
When it suited, the geographical integrity of the single island would dominate the 
nationalist’s mental map. But there were times and moods (more frequent, needless to 
add, in recent years) when such a picture did not suit, when it became impossible to 
distance oneself from the north-east corner of the Irish land-mass, and to attach 
significance to its being painted politically another colour. At such times and in such 
moods … the boundary stands out, as a weal, marking, not mere county lines, but the 
start of a different, if not indeed an alien, country.105 
This retraction of the territory of the “imagined community”, it has been argued in this article, 
had deep roots. The Republic’s ambiguous attitude towards Northern Ireland may well be 
traceable back to a perception, deeply embedded within southern political elites already by 
the time partition was implemented, of that part of the island as “a place apart”—an “alien 
and remote” corner, politically and culturally distinct from the rest of the island, yet forming 
part of nationalists’ mental image of “Ireland”.106 
The creation of a separate Northern Ireland entity has been described as an “awesome 
enterprise”, given its absence of an identity; labour and radical opinion in Britain in the early 
twentieth century saw it as “leading on to entrenchment of vested interests building up either 
side of an indefensible border line and resulting in progressive alienation”.107 This 
interpretation is compatible with the processes of change and adaptation discussed in this 
article: the progressive relegation of demands for Irish unity to the domain of rhetoric, and 
their collapse in the 1970s; the preference for modest cross-border cooperation rather than 
strong all-island institutions; and the steady move initially towards de facto recognition of 
Northern Ireland and then, more haltingly, towards de jure recognition. In each of these 
areas, the Good Friday agreement of 1998, it might be argued, constituted the cap-stone of 
political evolution towards acceptance of the reality of partition. It is, however, too early to 
predict whether this new, apparently stable alignment of ideology with geopolitical structures 
has the capacity to withstand the shocks and unintended consequences of the United 
Kingdom’s painful path towards redefining its relationship with the European Union. 
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